

UNITED STATES ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL

Fort Benning, Georgia

3 July 1968

OPERATIONS OF THE 2ND PLATOON (REIN), COMPANY B, 3RD
RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION, 3RD MARINE DIVISION (REIN),
FMF, ON A PATROL IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION HOLT FROM 2-6
JULY 1966 IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.
(PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF A RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY
EXECUTIVE OFFICER.)



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INTRODUCTION

In March 1966, North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units overran an Army Special Forces Camp at A Shau in Thua Thien Province near the Laotian border. Following this action, reports of NVA infiltration into the northern provinces increased significantly.

In early April 1966, intelligence reports indicated that the NVA 324-B Division was infiltrating across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) into Quang Tri Province. On 17 April, the 3rd Marine Division launched Operation Virginia, a multi-battalion search and destroy operation, but no indications of an enemy build-up were discovered. On 30 May, a reconnaissance in force operation was conducted along the DMZ. This operation also terminated without making contact with NVA units. Nevertheless, during June 1966, division intelligence reported an NVA subregional headquarters, an NVA regimental headquarters, and three NVA battalions, as well as numerous Viet Cong units, in a jungle area west of Hue.

THE DIVISION PLAN

Recognizing that such infiltration posed a serious threat to the vital coastal areas, which contained 90 per cent of the rice crop and population in both provinces, the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, ordered the 3rd Marine Division to increase reconnaissance and surveillance operations in an effort to locate and ultimately destroy the NVA units.

In June 1966, the 3rd Marine Division was disposed between Da Nang and Phu Bai. The 4th Marine Regiment (4th Marines), located in Phu Bai, was responsible for the northern portion of the division tactical area of responsibility (TADR).

In view of the force Order, the 4th Marines planned a series of battalion size operations to locate and destroy NVA units in the area. Reconnaissance Group Bravo, consisting of the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company and Company B, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion, was established to assist the 4th Marines in locating enemy forces.

THE EXISTING SITUATION

The 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion

The 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion supported the division by conducting reconnaissance patrols beyond the boundaries of the infantry battalion TADR's. During the conduct of these patrols, the battalion developed a new concept for reconnaissance operations.

During past wars, reconnaissance elements were never allowed to engage the enemy if they could avoid contact. However, on 7 October 1965, a Force Order officially established regulations under which reconnaissance patrols were permitted to engage the enemy. This order pertained only to Vietnam and did not change the standard doctrine. The patrols' primary mission continued to be the collection of intelligence information. However, the Force Order permitted the patrols to return fire when fired upon, and, under certain conditions, to initiate contact using both organic and supporting arms. In fact, patrols were sent out with specific missions to establish ambushes and to capture prisoners. The patrol leaders were encouraged to be aggressive, and they had the authority to initiate contact at their discretion. As a result of this policy, the reconnaissance units gained their best intelligence information from prisoners and from captured documents.

In June 1965, the 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion headquarters was in Da Nang. Company B and the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company were located in Phu Bai and supported the 4th Marines.

Operation Halt

The 4th Marines planned to initiate Operation Halt, one of a series of surveillance operations, on 2 July. The 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines (3/4) was assigned the mission of locating an NVA Regimental

Headquarters reported to be in a jungle area west of Hue. The battalion could also be expected to encounter Viet Cong elements.

Although the Marines had not yet encountered the NVA, the enemy was believed to be well trained and well supplied. The Main Force Viet Cong units were known to be well trained and supplied. Other Viet Cong elements in the area were well supplied, but they were often careless when not in the vicinity of Marine forces.

The weather for Operation Holt was hot and dry. Water sources west of the Song Bo River were scarce. The Village area to the north was known to be heavily pro-Viet Cong. Division reconnaissance patrols had reported continuous guerrilla activity in the area. They further reported that the area consisted of medium size hills and heavy jungle, and that movement was largely restricted to a haphazard trail network.

THE BATTALION PLAN

The 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines was assigned the mission of finding and destroying enemy personnel and equipment in the area bordered by the Song Bo River on the south and east, grid line 56 on the west, and Co Si Thanh Yan Village on the north. Following a B-52 strike on the morning of 2 July 1966, the battalion planned to land by helicopter on the banks of the Song Bo River and sweep north. (See Map "A")

Artillery, gunships, supplies, and regimental headquarters elements were to be located at YD 635250. A permanent observation post (OP) was manned by the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company to the west on Hill 674. (See Map "A")

Immediately following the battalion's landing, a seventeen-man patrol from Company B, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion was to be inserted by helicopter to screen the approach to the battalion's left flank and rear through the Khe Tran Me Valley. (See Map "A")

THE PATROL PLAN

In addition to its reconnaissance mission, the patrol was directed to screen the approach through the Khe Tran Me Valley and to attempt to capture a prisoner. To carry out its mission, the patrol was further directed to establish ambushes along a well worn trail which ran through the valley directly into the battalion operating area. (See Map "A")

The patrol was to be inserted by helicopter at 070900H into a landing zone (LZ) at coordinates YD 521178. It was to be extracted at 070900H from an LZ at coordinates YD 540187 (See Map "A"). The patrol planned to keep the trail under continuous observation and to set frequent ambushes along it while simultaneously moving towards the extraction LZ. The patrol also planned to make maximum use of the supporting artillery-in carrying out its missions.

THE PREPARATION

The patrol leader received the patrol order on 28 June 1966. Since a combat mission was specified, the patrol needed more combat power than for routine reconnaissance patrols. To meet this need, the 2nd Platoon was reinforced with a squad from the 1st Platoon, and the company executive officer was designated patrol leader. The total strength, including a corpsman, was seventeen men.

Upon receipt of the patrol order, the patrol leader issued a warning order to the team leaders and arranged for a helicopter reconnaissance of the operational area. He then organized the patrol into four teams and rehearsed movement, immediate action, and ambushes. On the morning of the 29th, the patrol leader studied the map with his team leaders and then made an aerial reconnaissance. In order to deceive the enemy, the helicopters flew directly over the objective area only once, circled an area several miles away, and returned to base via another route.

Upon completion of his reconnaissance, the patrol leader formulated his basic plan. He then personally delivered copies of the patrol order to, and coordinated with, all nearby friendly units. He coordinated with the battalion operations officer (5-3) of 3/4 to insure that his plan would adequately support the battalion operation. He coordinated with the regimental combat operations center (COC) to insure that they knew his basic plan. He coordinated with the helicopter squadron

to set up the insertion and extraction, and to confirm the radio frequencies to be used. Finally, he coordinated with the S-3 of the general support (GS) artillery battalion. The artillery S-3 agreed to monitor the patrol radio frequency at all times to insure rapid response to fire missions. Furthermore, the patrol leader gave the S-3 a list of preplanned concentrations to support the insertion. These concentrations included the planned insertion LZ and prominent terrain features in the immediate vicinity. After insertion, the patrol leader planned to register concentrations as the patrol moved, and then to cancel them when they were no longer needed. Thus, he could always have several registered concentrations from which he could immediately shift fire.

On the morning of 30 June, the patrol leader issued the complete order to the entire patrol. The team leaders spent the remainder of the day getting their teams ready. The patrol leader made certain that the radios functioned properly and that all ordnance and special equipment ~~was~~^{were} available. (See Annex "A," Patrol Equipment)

More rehearsals were held on the morning of 1 July. That afternoon, C-rations were issued and a weapons inspection was held. The patrol leader checked with the regimental intelligence officer (S-2) and the S-3 of 3/4 to obtain any last-minute details.

Early on the morning of 2 July, ammunition and special ordnance were issued and a final inspection

was held. The patrol entrucked and moved with the regimental COC elements to the operation area. The company commander and communications personnel from Company B also moved with the regimental COC to handle the patrol's radio traffic and to coordinate the patrol's activity with the maneuver battalion. 3/4 was to be inserted at 0800; the reconnaissance patrol at 0900.

NARRATION

The patrol landed at 020940 and immediately moved away from the LZ in case the insertion had been detected by the enemy. The 1st Team handled the point, the 2nd Team contained the headquarters section, the 3rd Team handled navigation, and the 4th Team maintained rear security (See Annex B, Organization for Movement). Due to the vegetation, the patrol used a column formation throughout the operation.

THE FIRST DAY

The patrol moved cross-compartment to the top of the hill located at coordinates YD 524179 (See Map "B"). Here the patrol found the trail that they sought. On top of the hill was a clearing, thirty meters by thirty meters, which bordered the trail and appeared to be a rest area. Pieces of ponchos and worn out web equipment were scattered around. The patrol leader halted the patrol on the edge of the trail and made a reconnaissance of the area with the point team. While

conducting his reconnaissance, the patrol leader was notified by the 4th Team that an enemy patrol was moving east along a ridgeline toward the insertion LZ. The patrol leader moved his patrol about 20 meters from the trail so that he could observe the enemy without danger of being observed. (See Map "B")

The time was now 1230. The enemy patrol, consisting of eight men in black "pajamas" with weapons and packs, stopped to rest about 500 meters from the patrol (See /, Map "B"). The patrol leader immediately called for artillery fire. He purposely called the first round 100 meters to the right because the patrol was on the gun-target line. He then called for an adjustment and requested fire for effect. The 155 mm rounds killed two of the Viet Cong, but a short round hit the hill behind the patrol. The patrol leader shifted the fire to the right and quickly moved the patrol back toward the LZ to ambush the remaining enemy. No contact was made. The patrol moved back to the trail and set up an L-shaped ambush at the clearing (See Map "B").

The first three teams were positioned where they could observe the trail and use the clearing as the killing zone. Due to the convex slope of the hill, the patrol could not observe the entire clearing. The 4th Team was placed in defile on the east end of the ambush to cover the lower portion of the clearing. The ambush was set in at 1500. At 1515, the 3rd Team opened fire (Ambush #1; see 2, Map "B"). The 3rd

Team leader had moved his team forward to obtain better observation of the trail. As a result, the team was seen by the Viet Cong before they entered the killing zone. The 3rd Team killed two guerrillas and estimated that two others escaped. The dead guerrillas were not armed and carried no papers.

While the patrol leader was checking the dead enemy, a shot was fired by a member of the 1st Team (Ambush #2; see **3**, Map "G"). Another guerrilla had approached the clearing from the other direction. He was killed with his weapon at sling arms, even though 20 shots had been fired just ten minutes before. He carried a rifle, a pack, and several documents. The patrol hid the bodies on the side of the hill, collected the enemy equipment, and moved off the trail to the north.

The patrol observed no more enemy movement on 2 July. At 1700, the patrol moved to coordinates YD 526186 to set in for the night. The patrol leader registered a concentration 500 meters south of the patrol position from which he could adjust. He also requested that harassing fires be fired throughout the night along the trail through the valley and on likely enemy base camp areas.

THE SEARCH

On the morning of 3 July, the patrol received instructions to search for a suspected enemy base camp in the vicinity of coordinates YD 530179. The patrol

found no trace of enemy activity in that area on the 3rd. The patrol spent the night near enough to the trail to hear any large force moving along it. The patrol leader again registered artillery, but the night passed quietly. The search continued on the 4th. At 1230 the patrol discovered a skeleton and a rifle at coordinates YD 530180. The remainder of the day and that night were uneventful.

THE FOURTH DAY

On the morning of 5 July, the patrol moved back toward the trail. At 1010, they reached the trail at coordinates YD 528183 (See / , Map "C"). The patrol leader stopped the patrol and told the 1st Team Leader to put out security. The first two men moved about ten meters down the trail to the left (south). The third man, carrying an M-79, turned to the right just as a Viet Cong walked around a bend in the trail. The Marine fired his M-79 and, even though the distance was not far enough to aim the round, knocked the enemy down (Ambush #3). The M-79 man then took cover on the side of the trail. The patrol leader moved to cover the M-79 man as three of the enemy sprayed the area with automatic weapons. Due to the heavy undergrowth, the patrol leader was the only man who could observe the enemy position. He called for grenades and forced the enemy to withdraw. One Viet Cong was killed by a grenade, and one rifle was captured. The patrol

boobytrapped the trail with a grenade and moved rapidly to a new ambush position at coordinates YD 527182 (See 2, Map "C").

At this position, the first three teams were placed on line ten meters above the trail. A claymore mine was placed at each end of the ambush to cover the trail and to protect the flanks. The 4th Team was positioned ten meters to the rear to provide depth and security. At 1150, an unknown number of Viet Cong approached the ambush from the southwest (3rd Team). The first man to spot the enemy became excited and clicked the safety on his rifle, thus disclosing the ambush. Likewise, the team leader failed to detonate the claymore. As a result, only the enemy point man was killed and one submachine gun captured (Ambush #4).

At this time, the patrol leader decided to move away from the trail. He knew that Viet Cong elements were on both sides, and he believed that the last group had been looking for his patrol. The patrol leader boobytrapped the trail again and moved the patrol to the hilltop at coordinates YD 526184 (See Y, Map "C").

At 1545, the patrol heard voices on the trail in the vicinity of Ambush #4. The patrol immediately notified the regimental COC and requested gunships to strafe the trail. Ten HU-1E's arrived in ten minutes and, under the direction of the patrol, strafed the trail with M-60 ammunition and 2.75-inch rockets. The gunships then directed two A1's in an airstrike on the

trail. The AI's expended their complete load of 70 mm ammunition and rockets. A few minutes after the air strike was completed, the patrol heard movement in the brush along the trail as if several men were thrashing around. The patrol leader sent the 4th Team to check on the noise, but it was not heard again and the team was recalled.

At 1700, the patrol heard an explosion. A series of screams and groans followed. The Viet Cong had tripped the boobytrap near Ambush #3. The patrol again called for gunships. Fifteen minutes later, one HU-1F arrived and strafed the trail with M-60 ammunition and rockets. The groaning stopped, but the gunship was unable to sight any enemy. The patrol leader requested the gunship to remain on station while he investigated. The gunship pilot agreed. The patrol leader instructed the assistant patrol leader to remain in position with the rest of the patrol and to turn on the back-up radio. Accompanied by his radioman and the 1st Team, the patrol leader left to check out the area. The patrol leader moved the team rapidly to where the grenade had exploded. Two Viet Cong had come from the east along the trail with a stretcher to get the body of the guerrilla killed in Ambush #3. Although both were still alive when the patrol found them, they were covered with shrapnel wounds from head to foot. The patrol leader called the CUC and asked if they wanted to hoist out the wounded prisoners by helicopter. By this time, however, night was falling and the

helicopter pilots said that they could not get them out. The patrol leader put a guard on the prisoners and took one man with him to check out the trail as far as ambush site #4. Nothing further was discovered as a result of the air strikes, and the body of the guerrilla killed in Ambush #4 had not been disturbed. The patrol leader returned to the team and was informed that the two wounded Viet Cong had died. The patrol leader directed the team to rejoin the rest of the patrol.

Before the team had moved ten meters off the trail, the COC directed the patrol to move to the nearest LZ for immediate extraction. The patrol leader replied that the helicopters could either hoist the entire patrol out from their present location on the trail, or they could wait until morning. The patrol leader stated that there was no danger and that the patrol could continue its mission. The COC radioed that the sweeping battalion had made no significant contact and that the patrol was to move to the nearest LZ for extraction at 060700. The patrol leader replied that the patrol would be ready for extraction at 0700 from the insertion LZ.

The patrol leader released the gunship and rejoined the rest of the patrol. It was too dark to change the patrol's position that night, so the patrol leader and his men formed a circle and set out six claymore mines. The patrol leader requested a number of harassing fires and then placed four concentrations

around HILL 292 at coordinates YD 526196 to deceive the enemy as to the patrol's true location. He did not plan fires completely around his position. Intermingled with the harassing fires, he adjusted two nearby concentrations from which he could adjust. The night was uneventful.

THE EXTRACTION

At dawn the patrol started toward the LZ. The patrol moved along the ridgeline and crossed the trail about 75 meters below the clearing where it had initiated the two ambushes on 2 July. As the patrol crossed the trail, the patrol leader heard a faint metallic ring as if someone on top of the hill had banged a canteen. He moved the patrol across the trail and stopped. No other sounds were heard. Still, the patrol leader suspected an ambush. He directed a slight detour and approached the LZ from the south~~west~~. The patrol set up security around the LZ and notified the COC that they were ready for extraction. At 0655, two gunships arrived on station and the patrol leader directed them to observe the suspected ambush site. The helicopters arrived at 0700 and the patrol was extracted without incident. (See Map "D")

The helicopters took the patrol back to the regimental COC. The patrol leader directed the assistant patrol leader to inventory the captured material (See Annex "C," Captured Equipment).

Meanwhile, he requested artillery fire on the suspected enemy ambush site. The patrol then reported to the regimental S-2 for debriefing.

RESULTS OF THE OPERATION

By body count, only 16 Viet Cong were killed on Operation Holt. 3/4 made one minor contact in which they killed nine of the enemy. The reconnaissance patrol made numerous contacts and killed seven guerrillas by body count. The results of the artillery mission and the air strikes were not confirmed and were not included in the total of enemy dead. There were no Marines killed.

3/4 failed to find any trace of NVA units near Hue. However, on 5 July, positive proof of NVA infiltration was discovered near the DMZ. That marked the beginning of Operation Hastings, the first major battle between the NVA and the Marines.

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

1. The reconnaissance patrol was assigned a combat mission in addition to its standard reconnaissance mission. Although in keeping with the concept of reconnaissance operations in Vietnam, the mission and the patrol's actions directly violated the Marine Corps' standard reconnaissance doctrine. The patrol attempted to engage the enemy throughout the operation. Furthermore, it continued to operate freely despite numerous contacts. The patrol leader used his knowledge

of the enemy, the terrain, and patrolling techniques to retain the initiative and disrupt enemy movement. The patrol not only carried out its reconnaissance mission, it killed nearly as many Viet Cong as the entire infantry battalion. Had the patrol followed standard doctrine, less intelligence would have been obtained, and fewer Viet Cong killed.

The concept of reconnaissance operations, as developed in Vietnam, was established in operations against guerrilla forces. Under most circumstances, guerrillas should be killed at every opportunity. It is useless to report small guerrilla movements. They are gone before a reaction force can gain contact. Furthermore, small kills are important in guerrilla warfare. Every guerrilla must be hunted down and killed. Opportunities are often few; none should be wasted.

2. As directed, the patrol established ambushes along the trail. However, the patrol only sprung two deliberate ambushes. Neither was completely successful due to the actions of the 3rd Team Leader. On the first ambush, he moved his team without permission of the patrol leader and was consequently seen by the Viet Cong. On the other, he failed to detonate a claymore mine as directed.

For maximum efficiency, a patrol leader must know his men and every member of the patrol must work together. The patrol leader had not previously operated with the 2nd Platoon. As a result, he placed the 3rd

Team leader in a position demanding too much responsibility. No prisoner was captured and several Viet Cong escaped.

3. In the contact referred to as Ambush #3, chance contact was made while the patrol was preparing to move into an ambush position. The patrol was actually split into three segments. These segments were unable to observe each other due to the heavy brush. The B-79 man was in an exposed position and the Viet Cong were spraying the area with automatic fire. The patrol leader moved to aid the B-79 man and personally forced the enemy to withdraw.

The patrol leader's job is to direct the action, not to do everything himself. However, in small-unit actions it is often necessary for the leader to really take charge. In this situation, the patrol members were not used to working together and could not fire without danger of hitting one of their own men. Immediate action was necessary and the patrol leader took it.

4. The patrol operated within artillery range to supplement its limited organic firepower. The patrol leader adjusted concentrations and called for harassing fires without incident. However, during the one fire mission called on the enemy, the patrol was on the gun-target line and a short round hit behind the patrol.

The short round could have dealt the patrol serious casualties. Had the patrol leader been more familiar

with artillery capabilities, he could have adjusted using high angle fire. This would have lessened the chances of a short round hitting the hill where the patrol was positioned.

5. The COC directed the patrol to search for an enemy base camp. This search lasted two days and diverted the patrol from the trail.

The patrol spent the two nights close enough to the trail to hear any large force moving along it. An aerial observer was available for random daylight observation. Moreover, the additional requirement placed upon the patrol was in keeping with its reconnaissance mission.

6. On the evening of 5 July, the patrol was directed to move to the nearest LZ for extraction because the COC thought the patrol might get into serious trouble. The patrol leader stated that extraction at that time was not feasible and that the patrol could continue to operate.

As the man on the scene, an experienced patrol leader is in a better position to make decisions than the COC. In this case, the patrol leader's judgment was accepted, and the patrol was extracted without incident.

7. Contrary to the operation order, the patrol requested extraction from the same LZ used for the insertion. For security purposes, patrols should not use the same LZ for insertion and extraction. In this

case, the COC changed the time for extraction and the patrol was forced to use the same LZ.

8. Until Ambush #4 was initiated on the fourth day of the patrol, the Viet Cong exhibited no caution. They walked along the trail with their weapons at sling area and paid little attention to their surroundings.

In jungle areas where Marine units seldom go, the Viet Cong are very careless until contact is made. Even then, due to poor enemy communications, Marine patrols can often operate several days without danger of organized resistance.

TRAINING IMPLICATIONS

1. Teamwork is a must for patrols operating deep in enemy territory. The patrol leader must know the capabilities of every man. Patrols must have standard operating procedures for movement, ambushes, and immediate action.

2. When engaged, small patrols must be able to accurately adjust artillery fire. This is of prime importance in jungle operations due to the short ranges involved in most engagements. The patrol should know the location of the supporting artillery and know its response time to fire missions. At least three members of each reconnaissance patrol should receive extensive forward observer training.

3. After a patrol is inserted, it should initially move cross-compartment. Viet Cong trails usually follow natural avenues such as ridgelines, streams,

and valleys. By moving cross-compartment, patrols can often find enemy trails fairly quickly.

4. Prior to the first contact, guerrillas are usually very careless when operating deep in their own territory. This carelessness often continues for several days due to their lack of communications. Because of this, friendly patrols can often move on the trails without danger until the first contact is made.

5. The Viet Cong use boobytraps extensively. When operating deep in enemy territory, United States forces can also employ them. Properly used, boobytraps are very effective in creating casualties and demoralizing the enemy.

6. To have a man missing, or to leave a body behind, is extremely demoralizing for any armed force. This is particularly true of guerrilla forces since they are extremely vulnerable to betrayal. A missing guerrilla, regardless of his status, compromises his entire unit. If guerrilla bodies are buried or hidden, the remainder of the guerrilla force may never know what happened to them. This is a psychological weapon the Marine Corps should use more often.

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ANNEX A. Patrol Equipment

1. Individual Equipment
 - a. M-14 rifle with five magazines
 - b. Two M-26 grenades
 - c. One yellow smoke grenade
 - d. Compass
 - e. Four canteens
 - f. C-rations for six days
 - g. Salt tablets
 - h. Water purification tablets

2. Special Equipment
 - a. One M-79 with 24 rounds
 - b. One M-12 shotgun with 30 rounds
 - c. Six claymore mines
 - d. Two white phosphorus grenades
 - e. Two CS grenades
 - f. One PRC-25 radio
 - g. One PRC-10 radio
 - h. One 7x50 binoculars
 - i. Four red aircraft panels
 - j. Twenty feet of $\frac{1}{2}$ -inch nylon line

ANNEX B. Organization for Movement

1. 1st Team (POINT)
 - a. Rifleman
 - b. Rifleman
 - c. 1st Team Leader
 - d. B-79 man

2. 2nd Team (HEADQUARTERS)
 - a. Patrol Leader (Navigator)
 - b. Radio Operator
 - c. Rifleman
 - d. Corpsman
 - e. Rifleman

3. 3rd Team (NAVIGATION)
 - a. Assistant Navigator
 - b. 3rd Team Leader
 - c. Rifleman
 - d. Rifleman

4. 4th Team (REAR SECURITY)
 - a. Assistant Radio Operator
 - b. Assistant Patrol Leader
 - c. Rifleman
 - d. Rifleman

ANNEX C. Captured Equipment

1. Weapons

- a. One-Chinese Communist 7.62 mm Carbine, Type 56
- b. One-Chinese Communist 7.62 mm Submachine gun, Type 50
- c. Two-Soviet 7.62 mm Assault Rifle, Type AK-47
- d. One-U.S. .30 cal. Carbine, M-1

2. Ammunition

- a. Six-Chinese Communist fragmentation grenades
- b. One-U.S. M-26 grenade
- c. 196-Rounds, AK-47 ammunition with five magazines
- d. 52-Rounds, Type 50 ammunition with two magazines
- e. 42-Rounds, .30 cal. ammunition with three magazines

3. Miscellaneous

- a. Three documents
- b. Three packs
- c. Five cartridge belts